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Succession of Dunham' is surely one of the more important
cases decided within the last ten years. The stakes were high, the
issues complex, and the parties adversary at almost every point.
Ted F. Dunham died survived by his widow, Katharine, two sons
of a prior marrage, and nine grandchildren. His will created eight
trusts: one each for his two sons and for six of his grandchildren.
His widow, Katharine, was named as executrix and she, one Alex-
ander, a business associate, and a bank were named as co-trustees of
each of the eight trusts. At issue were: the classification of shares in
related close held corporations, the regularity of a stock redemption
provoked by the executrix, satisfaction of the legitime of the two
sons, removal of the executrix and individual trustees, and the value
of certain succession property.
Classification of Stock
Some three years prior to his marriage to Katharine, decedent
acquired 490 shares in a close held corporation evidenced by a stock
certificate registered in the name of Katharine (then his secretary)
and endorsed by her to his order. Although Katharine claimed the
shares were issued to her as owner and endorsed by her only for
the purpose of financing the acquisition transaction, the first circuit
gave little weight to her testimony nor to stock records "prepared
carelessly and perhaps in haste." Although the endorsement ap-
peared as though someone had attempted to eradicate it, (which the
widow testified she had done at her husband's direction) the court
nevertheless found ownership to be in the endorsee decedent. The
supreme court reversed on this issue finding a want of donative in-
tent. According, the shares were Mr. Dunham's separate property.
An additional 1,000 shares of the same corporation were pur-
chased by Dunham prior to his marriage to Katharine under an
Oklahoma agreement styled "conditional sale." According to the
document, title to the shares was to remain in the seller until final
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 393 So. 2d 438 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980), aff'd in part and revd in part, No.
81-C-0140 slip op. (La. 1981).
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payment was made-an event which did not occur until after dece-
dent and Katharine were married. She claimed the shares were com-
munity property while the sons argued that they were separate. In
characterizing the sales document, the first circuit (after some
straining) held that the legal effects of the transaction were the
same as though there had been an immediate sale followed by a
pledge of the shares to secure the credit portion of the purchase
price. The Supreme Court agreed but on the basis that all the par-
ties assumed that Louisiana law controlled. (But even if they didn't,
it would).
The shares of the corporation (discussed above) were subject to
a redemption agreement 'between the company and the decedent
which provided that the shares were redeemable at a price not less
than book value nor greater than 105 percent thereof. The widow, as
executrix, obtained court authority to redeem 394 shares for the
stated purposes of securing funds to pay taxes and expenses of ad-
ministration, and in order to secure the tax advantages under Sec-
tion 303 of the Internal Revenue Code.! One of the sons unsuc-
cessfully sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the sale which
eventually took place after the injunction was denied and no suspen-
sive appeal taken. The son took a devolutive appeal which was dis-
missed as moot inasmuch as the sale for $590,000 had already taken
place.' However, the appellate court reserved the son's right to set
the sale aside or sue the widow for breach of fiduciary duty.
In the present action, the trial court found that the actual
redemption took place on the day before some $500,000 in corporate
net income would have been credited to the book value which, in
turn, would have substantially increased the redemption price. The
first circuit found a breach of the executrix' fiduciary duty in her
failure to secure an amended court order either setting aside the
sale or increasing the price to reflect the increased book value. Such
action, said the court, was a violation of the fiduciary duty to
preserve succession property.' However, the court refused to find
that she had violated the fiduciary duty not to sell succession prop-
erty to herself, although as a result of the redemption her propor-
tionate ownership of the corporation was increased. The court cited
article 3195 of the Code of Civil Procedure which exempts from the
2. The court relied on Barbet v. Langlois, 5 La. Ann. 212 (1850), and Due v. Due,
342 So. 2d 161 (La. 1977), discusaed in 3 G. LEVAN, LOUISIANA ESTATE PLANNER No. 1
at 50 (1976). Internal Revenue Code section 303 permits capital gains treatment of par-
tial redemptions in certain circumstances which would otherwise be treated as
dividends and taxed as ordinary income.
3. Succession of Dunham, 359 So. 2d 674 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
4. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 3191 & 3221.
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self-dealing-by-sale prohibition the surviving spouse, a partner with
regard to partnership assets, and a co-owner as to property owned
in indivision. The first circuit analogized Mrs. Dunham's position as
a corporate shareholder to that of a partner or co-owner and thus
the exception applied. The court rejected the argument that the ar-
ticle 3195 exception should apply only where the fiduciary was not
benefited by the sale:
[I]n all likelihood all sales that would be made to the persons ex-
cepted by Article 3195 would benefit the persons excepted, or
they would never take place. The policy behind this codal article
clearly contemplates benefit to the persons excepted.'
Alternatively, the sons argued that the widow had breached her
fiduciary obligation by failing to "spin-off" the land owned by a real
estate subsidiary by distribution to the shareholders of the parent
company, thereby yielding a favorable tax result. In order to
generate cash sufficient to finance the redemption, the executrix
had caused the land to be sold to third persons. The court rejected
this argument because stock ownership of the real estate subsidiary
had been in continuous dispute. Moreover, there was neither evi-
dence that the executrix had received such tax advice nor was such
suggested by the sons' accountants until after the redemption was
complete.' The supreme court affirmed the question of breach of
fiduciary obligation, emphasizing her active role as a corporate
director in the transaction.
In the earlier injunction proceeding, the first circuit had refused
to set aside the redemption sale because the corporation was not a
party to the proceeding, and further because no recission was
sought. Since the purchase of succession assets (via redemption) by
the executrix was not prohibited by article 3195 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the court found no authority to set the sale aside. The
only recognized remedy for a breach of article 3221 (which requires
the executor to preserve and protect succession property) was an ac-
tion for damages. In other words, the executrix had the power to
contract for sale (via redemption) to herself. The fact that she
breached a fiduciary duty by failing to cause the corporation to pay
a reasonable price was not grounds to set aside the sale. The sole
remedy was in damages for the deficit:
Here, even if we consider the redemption to constitute a sale by
the executrix to herself through an intermediary.... a question
5. 393 So. 2d 438, 448 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980) (emphasis added).
6. Moreover, said the court, the executrix as controlling shareholder of the
parent company would have been required to control the subsidiary through the
parent and the court was "unwilling to pierce two corporate veils." Id at 449.
[Vol. 42
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upon which we do not need to render a decision, nevertheless, as
we have seen, Mrs. Dunham falls within the stated exceptions
and the sale cannot be set aside for that reason. Then we fall
back upon Articles 3191 and 3221, which read together, provide
but one remedy for mismanagement, damages .... In the pre-
sent case, damages are not sought. There is no showing as to
quantum. All that is sought is a judgment setting aside the sale.
The codal authority does not afford that remedy. Hence, we
must refuse to set aside the sale. We reserve appellant's right to
proceed against Mrs. Dunham by separate action to obtain
damages for her breach of fiduciary duty.'
Legitime
The testamentary trusts for the benefit of the two sons were
confined to their forced portions, the disposable portion passing to
the trusts for the grandchildren. The sons argued that the legitime
trusts were insufficient in that they were subjected to maximum
spendthrift restraints, and that the trust property was largely com-
posed of close held corporate stock (of the parent company) which
had paid no dividends in almost forty years. This, argued the sons,
was in violation of article 12, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution
providing that "no law shall abolish forced heirship." The first cir-
cuit acknowledged that the legitime could be placed in trust-without
violating the constitution' and could be subjected to spendthrift
restraints.? However, the court did not interpret the Constitution as
permitting the legitime to be invested wholly in non-income produc-
ing property. The sons prayed that the trusts be either terminated
or that the trustees be ordered to sell the stock and to invest the
proceeds in income producing assets. The court responded:
We note that the trusts are for the lives of the two forced heirs;
there is no possibility of their ever receiving principal. An incre-
ment to principal is of no benefit to them. To receive their
legitime, they must receive income as well as the hollow and
meaningless shell of principal, and income from Anderson-Dun-
ham must necessarily be in the form of dividends."
7. Id at 450 (emphasis added).
8. Id. at 450. The supreme court reserved to the sons an action in damages
against the executrix, but carefully avoided any comment on the merits of the claim.
9. Succession of Earhart, 220 La. 817, 57 So. 2d 695 (1952).
10. Succession of Singlust, 169 So. 2d 10 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964), writ refused 247
La. 262, 170 So. 2d 512 (1965). Earhart and Singlust were decided under the constitu-
tion of 1921, but the court found no significant change in the constitution of 1974. As a
matter of fact, the new constitution expressly permits the forced portion to be placed
in trust. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 5.
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In support of its position, the court cited Succession of Burgess."'
The first circuit read Burgess to say:
that swampland in trust would not satisfy legitime requirements
where a forced heir was principal and income beneficiary of a
trust created for his life (subject, in that case, to the usufruct of
the surviving spouse) if the swampland was unproductive. The
court further stated that swampland should be sold if income
from the swampland was found to be insufficient to satisfy the
legitime, the measure of sufficiency being the present value of
future income the forced heir could expect based on his life ex-
pectancy (with deduction for the surviving spouse's usufruct, a
problem that does not concern us here).
The principal is thus established by Burgess that if an in-
come and principal interest representing the legitime is placed
in trust, the trust property must be at least reasonably produc-
tive of income.
The prudent man rule with respect to trust investments ...
also required that trust property must be productive to be re-
tained. [R.S. 9:2127, Trust Code.]
As property not constituting the legitime must be sold if it
does not yield sufficient income, still more must property that
constitutes the legitime be sold or otherwise disposed of if in
time it is unproductive of income, for two reasons: (1) retaining
the property in trust impinges upon the legitime, and (2) retain-
ing the property in trust violates the prudent man rule with
respect to investments.12
Supporting its refusal to terminate the trusts or order sale of the
shares, the court concluded:
We do not find that it violates the spirit of Burgess to decline to
order an immediate sale of the . . . stock, or that the prudent
man rule requires a sale without judicious hesitation to allow
new trustees to exert their influence .... It is somewhat unlikely
that if the ... stock held in the trusts for the children is ordered
sold, it will produce its true value. A minority interest in a close-
ly held corporation does not generally sell for its true value. 3
However, the court reserved the sons' rights to proceed in the trial
court to force a sale "if within a reasonable time Anderson-Dunham
has still failed to pay dividends commensurate with principal."
11. 359 So. 2d 1006 (La. App. 4th Cir.) writ denied, 360 So. 2d 1179 (La. 1978).
12. 393 So. 2d at 451.
•13. Id. at 452-53.
[Vol. 42
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Removal of the Executrix
The trial court had refused to remove Mrs. Dunham as executrix
because mere conflict of interest between the succession represen-
tative and heirs was insufficient ground for removal, citing Succes-
sion of Kaffie," and Succession of Favalora15 In particular, the trial
court relied on Succession of Houssiere," which it interpreted as
holding that a succession representative could not be removed for
anticipated mismanagement. Apparently, the trial court did not find
prior mismanagement. However, the first circuit did find prior
mismanagement in the form of the stock redemption-a failure to
preserve succession assets and thus a breach of the fiduciary obliga-
tion. The first circuit removed the executrix." The Supreme Court
affirmed.
Removal of Individual Trustees
The trial court removed the widow and Alexander as trustees of
the legitime trusts, but refused to remove them as trustees for the
grandchildren. The first circuit removed them both from all trusts.
Noting only two prior cases dealing with the removal of the
trustee18 the first circuit held that mere animosity between trustee
and beneficiary was insufficient ground for removal. However:
In the present case, although animosity must be said to exist,
much more than animosity exists. First we note that in tradi-
tional trust law animosity that colors the judgment of the
trustee is grounds for removal. Restatement of Trusts, 2nd, Sec-
tion 107, Comment C. Oppenheim and Ingram . . . Treatise on
Trust . . . Section 136, indicate this view would be followed by
Louisiana courts. It is shown that Mrs. Dunham and Mr. Alexander
conveniently delayed their acceptances of the trust for the two
sons until such time as the stock redemption had taken place ...
It was their duty either to have recused themselves as trustees,
as it is obvious that they intended to accept the trusts as soon
as the redemption had taken place, or to have accepted the
trusts and actively opposed the sale in their capacities as
trustees. They did neither. Rather than opposing the sale or
recusing themselves, as would appear to have been the more
14. 273 So. 2d 318 (La. App. 3d Cir.) writ refused, 276 So. 2d 701 (La. 1973).
15. 169 So. 2d 197 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964), writ refused, 247 La. 355, 171 So. 2d
476 (1965).
16. 247 La. 764, 174 So. 2d 521 (1965).
17. See LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3182.
18. Holladay v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank, 312 So. 2d 883 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975); Suc-
cession of Supple, 274 So. 2d 790 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
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proper course, they did nothing, thereby permitting the succes-
sion and the trusts to sustain a substantial injury. This was a
breach of their fiduciary duties as trustees, having been both a
breach of the duty to act prudently in selling investments (R.S.
9:2127, Trust Code) and their duty to administer the trust solely
in the interest of the beneficiaries (R.S. 9:2082, Trust Code) as
the sale benefited Mrs. Dunham as a shareholder and strength-
ened Mr. Alexander's position as corporate president. Also, as
trustees it was their duty to have caused the principal trust
property, stock ... to be productive of income. Income from the
stock to the trusts would necessarily have had to have been in
the form of dividends distributed by Anderson-Dunham. Trust-
ees are under a duty to take reasonable steps to obtain posses-
sion of legacies. [R.S. 9:2091, Trust Code, Comment (c)]. It was
the trustees' duty to have exerted pressure by threatening to
demand delivery of the legacy viz. corporate stock in trusts,
thereby influencing the corporation to distribute dividends, or to
demand delivery of the stock from Mrs. Dunham in her capacity
as executrix, so that the trustees could vote the stock in such a
manner that the corporation would declare dividends. They did
neither. Thus, they again breached their fiduciary duty .... The
same injury that occurred to the children also occurred to the
grandchildren. . . . The grandchildren also suffered from failure
of the corporation to declare dividends. 9
The supreme court affirmed, suggesting that the duty of the trustee
was even more onerous than that of the executor.
Valuation of Special Bequests-Effect on Legitime
Finally, the sons presented a novel argument regarding the
valuation of the decedent's half interest in his home, household effects,
and an office building specially bequeathed to the trust for one of
the grandchildren which was subject to the usufruct of his widow.
The valuation given to these assets would have a direct bearing on
the value of the active mass. The lower the valuation on these
assets, the less the legitime; the greater the valuation, the greater
the legitime. The sons argued for the higher value. The first circuit
settled the matter on the basis of expert testimony presented by
both sides. Whereas no new point of law was recognized or applied
by the court, the circumstances point up a mathematical relationship
that estate planners should keep in mind. A frequent Louisiana will
format consists of special bequests (ordinarily home and household
effects) followed by a fractional disposition of legitime by universal
19. 393 So. 2d at 453-54.
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title to forced heirs, concluding with a disposition of the residue.
Where such format is used, practitioners should remember that the
values assigned to the property specially bequeathed will have a
direct bearing on the value of the fractional bequest to forced heirs.
Accordingly, where typically low values are sought, the forced heirs
could be shortchanged. The supreme court did not comment on this
issue.
In Succession of Noe," Mrs. Noe died survived by three
children, one of whom was Mrs. Laine. Her brother and sister
received their forced portions outright. However, Mrs. Laine's por-
tion was bequeathed in trust, naming her sister and sister's husband
as trustees. The will divided the disposable portion among testamen-
tary trusts for her grandchildren. The parents of the grandchildren
were named as trustees of their respective trusts except that Mrs.
Laine's brother and sister were named co-trustees of the trust for
her daughter.
Several years later Mr. Noe died, his will reflecting a similar
pattern of disposition. However, he left Mrs. Laine's forced portion
to her outright and named her as sole trustee of the testamentary
trust for her daughter created over part of the disposable portion.
While both successions were still under administration, Mrs.
Laine sued to have her brother removed as co-trustee of her trust
and her daughter's trust, and to have herself substituted for him in
both instances. Her petition recited a "complete lack of harmony"
between Mrs. Noe and Mrs. Laine's husband at the time her will
was executed, but that Mrs. Laine had subsequently divorced her
husband and had had no contact with him for a number of years.
She noted that the later will of her father, executed after the
divorce, had left her her forced share outright and had named her as
trustee of her daughter's trust. She further alleged personal aliena-
tion between herself and her brother (named co-trustee of both
trusts), that they had not communicated in years except through at-
torneys, and thus would not be in a position to cooperate in the ad-
ministration of the various trusts. She further alleged that her
brother's fractional ownership in the assets of both successions and
the interests of his children would make it impossible for him to
discharge his fiduciary obligation as trustee of the trusts for Mrs.
Laine and her daughter.
Mrs. Laine claimed that the substitution of trustees was
authorized by Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2026 (Trust Code), per-
mitting the court to modify a trust due to circumstances unknown
20. 398 So. 2d 1173 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
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or not anticipated by the settlor which, if unchanged, would defeat
or substantially impair the purposes of the trust. Additionally, she
cited Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:1789, permitting removal of the
trustee by the court "for sufficient cause shown." According to Mrs.
Laine, the critical "change of circumstances" was her divorce from
her husband. As "cause" for removal of her brother, she alleged an
irreconcilable conflict of interest.
The second circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal of her suit
on exception of no cause of action. Citing copious authority collected
in an excellent footnote, the court stated that her petition failed to
contain factual allegations of impairment or interference with the
proper administration of the trusts. Co-ownership with an allegedly
hostile trustee was not necessarily an irreconcilable conflict of in-
terest. Moreover:
Mere hostility is not grounds for removal of a trustee, it is only
where such hostility interferes with the proper administration of
the trust that it constitutes reason for removal."'
WILLS
In Succession of Goode," the olographic will provided in part:
All oil and gas royalty interest payments owned by me shall be
paid to Pauline Egbert Parker for as long as she might live.
After her death, the amount of any payments shall be equally
divided between my nieces and nephews and Linda Cosby Paine.
Opponents of the will challenged the bequest as a prohibited
substitution alleging invalidity not only of the above disposition but
the entire will. The second circuit agreed that the disposition was a
prohibited substitution, and thus invalid, but that this had no effect
on the remainder of the will.23
The court looked to the recent decision of the supreme court in
Baten v. Taylor2' for guidance in identifying a prohibited substitu-
tion. In Baten v. Taylor, the supreme court adopted the analysis ad-
vanced by the Report of the Trust Code Committee, namely that in
order to be a prohibited substitution: (1) there must be a double
disposition in full ownership, (2) a charge upon the institute to
preserve and transmit the property to the substitute, (3) resulting in
21. Id. at 1178.
22. 395 So. 2d 875 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ granted, 401 So. 2d 359 (La. 1981).
23. Succession of Walters, 261 La. 59, 259 So. 2d 12 (1972).
24. 386 So. 2d 333 (La. 1979), discussed in 7 G. LEVAN, LOUISIANA ESTATE PLANNER
No. 2 at 178 (1980).
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a successive order burdening the institute to transfer the property
to the substitute. Proponents of the will argued that there was no
double disposition of full ownership, but rather a mere disposition of
successive usufructs, the naked ownership passing by intestacy. Ap-
parently, this argument concentrated on the use of the word
payments in both dispositions. Thus, it was argued that the bequest
was not of the royalties themselves, but only of the use of the
money generated. 5
The court struggled to find assurance that less than full owner-
ship was contemplated, searching in vain for such words as "use" or
"use and benefit" which would suggest usufruct:
The quoted language clearly indicates an intent on the part of
the testator to bequeath in full ownership royalty interests owned
by him rather than payments from royalty interests owned by
him.2"
Furthermore, the court found the requisite duty to preserve the in-
terests in full ownership and to transfer them to the substitute
beneficiaries. In its view, a double disposition in full ownership, if
valid, necessarily obligates the institute to preserve the property
for the benefit of the substitute. In supporting its holding, the court
relied almost entirely on older decisions of the supreme court which
narrowly construed the prohibited substitution." It did not refer to
Justice Dennis' discussion in Baten v. Taylor to the effect that in
light of that decision, the older cases needed reappraisal. 8
The civil law permitted various substitutions for centuries. The
vulgar substitution is still permitted out of trust," and at least three
would-be substitutions are permitted in trust.2 The redactors of the
Code Napoleon were determined to prohibit those kinds of substitu-
tions which had propped up the French aristocracy prior to the
French Revolution and which had permitted the perpetuation of
feudalism. Though feudalism has never been a real problem in Loui-
siana, the same prohibitions were adopted in article 1520 of the Civil
Code. Both in France and in Louisiana, these prohibitions created
25. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 546, 1520 & 1522.
26. 395 So. 2d at 877.
27. Succession of Simms, 250 La. 177, 195 So. 2d 114 (1966); Succession of
Thilborger, 234 La. 810, 101 So. 2d 678 (1958): Succession of Heft, 163 La. 467, 112 So.
301 (1927).
28. 386 So. 2d at 338.
29. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1521.
30. Class trusts, LA. R.S. 9:1906 (Supp. 1964); Conditional substitution trusts, LA.
R.S. 9:1973 (Supp. 1974); Invasions of Trust Principal, LA. R.S. 9.2068 (Supp. 1964 &
Supp. 1968, 1972 & 1974).
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traps for the unwary. In Louisiana, the prohibition became a weapon
against the importation of the trust. As a result of cases decided
within the twelve years preceding Creighton v. Succession of
Gredler,3" and culminating with that case, some lawyers detected
what appeared to be hostility to the trust among some of the
justices. This hostility, real or apparent, was a major impetus
towards the enactment of the Trust Code.
To read all of the Louisiana decisions involving prohibited
substitutions is an ordeal not recommended. To try to reconcile
them is folly. In many of these cases, it becomes apparent that the
testator's intentions were vague. The layman seems to intend
something like: "When I die I want A to have it, and when A dies, I
want B to have it." No detailed thought is given to such practical
consequences as what A can do with the property during his
lifetime. If a testator were asked to write a scenario describing the
relative rights and duties of A and B during A's lifetime, the result
would probably look more like usufruct and naked ownership than
the "successive disposition in full ownership" which is prohibited by
article 1520.
Undoubtedly due to the prohibited substitution, the civil law has
not developed a list of correlative rights and duties between suc-
cessive owners where each has full ownership. The common law has
the same problem defining a similar relationship in the context of
the reciprocal will. At common law, A and B can write wills
reciprocally leaving their property to each other, binding the sur-
vivor to leave his property (including that inherited from the first to
die) according to a prearranged plan. The common law courts have
struggled mightily in trying to decide what the survivor can do with
his own property and with the inherited property after the death of
the first of the reciprocal testators. Analogies to life tenancy
(usufruct) and trusts are sometimes used, but almost always un-
satisfactorily.
If courts are bound to follow the testator's intention, they
should try to apply the nearest permissible legal institution if no
violence is done to the testator's intent. The nearest permissible ar-
rangement to the disposition in Goode seems to be usufruct and nak-
ed ownership. We tempt no known feudal demon by doing so. The
phrase "oil and gas royalty interest payments" could easily be con-
strued as a usufruct of oil and gas royalties, without doing violence
to the testator's intention. As a matter of fact violence might be
done by not doing so.
31. 256 La. 156, 235 So. 2d 411 (1970).
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RENUNCIATION OF SUCCESSIONS
In Succession of Williams,32 Stella Williams died intestate sur-
vived by a daughter and a son. Desiring his interest in his mother's
succession to pass directly to his two children, the son proposed to
renounce his mother's succession. In connection with the sale of the
decedent's house, a petition for possession was prepared reciting
that the daughter and the son's two children accepted the succession
unconditionally. (The son was not a petitioner.) A deed to the pro-
spective purchaser was prepared whereby the son and daughter con-
veyed the interests they had earlier inherited from their father
(decedent's husband), and the daughter and the son's children con-
veyed the interests they had inherited from the decedent. Shortly
before these documents were signed by the daughter, her brother
had executed a formal renunciation of his interest in his mother's
succession.
Prior to the closing, the daughter's husband, an attorney, ex-
pressed some concern about title problems which might arise from
the manner in which the transaction was cast, but nothing was men-
tioned to the vendee or the latter's attorney at the closing. The next
day, the daughter's husband advised the closing attorney that his
wife would not accept the proceeds of the sale.
The pivotal question was the effect of the son's renunciation and
of the daughter's acceptance. Article 1022 of the Civil Code clearly
provided that upon the son's renunciation, his sister would become
her mother's sole heir.3 Moreover, article 1024 of the Civil Code
prevented the daughter from accepting her portion and refusing
that which fell to her by virtue of her brother's renunciation.' The
son's children could not represent him because he was still living. 5
The son and his children argued that, as heirs of the decedent,
they were all entitled to distribute her estate in the manner they
chose, citing Article 2291 of the Civil Code dealing with judicial con-
fessions. However, the second circuit here limited its effects to
judicial confessions of facts, rather than judicial confessions of law.
According to the court:
This was not merely an error or misapplication of the law by virtue
32. 405 So.2d 336 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
33. "The portion of the heir renouncing the succession, goes to his co-heirs of the
same degree .. " LA. CiV. CoDE art. 1022.
34. "He in whose favor the right of accretion exists, cannot refuse the portion of
the heir who has renounced, and keep that part which has fallen to him in his own
right, because he is bound to accept or renounce for the whole." LA. Civ. CODE art.
1024.
35. LA. CiV. CODE art. 899.
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of which an estate was distributed in a manner other than that
provided by law, but an attempt to proceed in a manner expressly
prohibited by law, i.e. by [the daughter] to accept only a portion
of the succession and by the [son's] children to represent a live
parent. 6
According to the court, in order to accomplish what the parties
desired, it would have been necessary for the son to renounce, for
the daughter to accept the entire succession and then to donate a
half interest to her brother's children. Since the son did not appear
as a party to the joint petition, his renunciation could not be con-
strued as an acceptance followed by a donation to his children. Ac-
cordingly, the second circuit set the judgment of possession aside as
a nullity. Moreover, the second circuit found that the daughter was
equitably estopped to accept the succession of her mother as sole
heir, even after her brother's renunciation. Had she undertaken to
do so, he would have revoked his prior renunciation as is permitted by
article 1031 of the Civil Code. 7 On rehearing, however, the second
circuit reversed and reinstated the judgment of the trial court.
While it was "apparent that the manner in which the estate was
distributed violated C.C. Arts. 1024 and 899 . .," said the court, "we
believe that this constituted an error of law . . . under which a
judicial confession cannot be revoked."3
ILLEGITIMATE INHERITANCE
In Succession of Ross"9 the decedent was married twice but had
no children from either marriage. Upon his death in 1971 (apparently
intestate) his widow was placed in possession of all his property
under a judgment of possession also rendered during 1971.
Alleged illegimate children of the decedent sued to set aside the
judgment of possession relying on Succession of Brown" and Trimble
v. Gordon." For. the purposes of intestacy, article 919 would have
subordinated acknowledged natural children to the surviving spouse,
whereas legitimates would have taken in preference to the spouse.
Article 919 was declared unconstitutional by the Louisiana Supreme
36. Succession of Williams, 405 So. 2d 336 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
37. "So long as the prescription of the 'ight of accepting is not acquired against
the heirs who have renounced, they have the faculty still to accept the succession, if it
has not been accepted by other heirs .. " LA. Civ. CODE art. 1031.
38. Succession of Williams, No. 14,548, slip op. at 2 (La. App. 2d Civ. Nov. 2, 1981).
39. 397 So. 2d 830 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
40. 338 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980); See 6 LEVANN, LOUISIANA ESTATE PLANNER No. 4
at 148 (1980). See generally Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); 4 G. LEVAN, LouI-
SIANA ESTATE PLANNER No. 2 at 76 (1977).
41. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
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Court in Succession of Brown as violating both the Louisiana Con-
stitution and the United States Constitution. Succession of Ross
squarely presented the question of retroactivity, not addressed in
Brown. The fourth circuit held that Brown should not be applied
retroactively, but only prospectively from September 3, 1980, the
date of the decision.
The majority relied on the recent Louisiana Supreme Court deci-
sion in LoveU v. Lovell.2 Lovell involved the constitutionality of article
160 of the Civil Code imposing an alimony obligation on the husband
but not on the wife. (Article 160 was amended in 1979 to make that
statute gender-neutral.) The supreme court was asked to apply that
holding retroactively. The fourth circuit relied on the following
language from Lovell:
In determining whether or not our decision should be given
retroactive effect, three factors should be considered: (1) the
decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new
principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on
which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first
impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed; (2)
the merits and demerits must be weighed in each case by look-
ing to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and
effect, and whether retrospective application will further or
retard its operation; and (3) the inequity imposed by retroactive
application must be weighed.'3
The fourth circuit concluded that Succession of Brown certainly
established a new principle of law, that substantial inequity would
result if all prior judgments of possession relying on article 919 of
the Civil Code were declared invalid, and that there was ample basis'
for avoiding the injustice or hardship by a holding of non-
retroactivity."
Ju.dge Redmann dissented:
To the arguments that judges' rules outrank the United States
Constitution, and that judges who cannot escape declaring a
statute unconstitutional may nevertheless escape the unwelcome
effect of the unconstitutionality (or may punish the litigant who
forced its declaration) by making up a rule that the unconstitu-
tionality is 'prospective,' the answer is that the supremacy
42. 378 So. 2d 418 (La. 1979).
43. 1d. at 421.
44. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971): Cipriano v. City of Houma,
395 U.S. 701 (1969).
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clause, U.S. Constitution Article 6, Clause 2, grants no such
supremacy to judges' rules.'
The majority opinion appears sound insofar as prospective
application is concerned. The question is: prospective from what
date? Three dates suggest themselves: the date of the decision in
Brown, September 3, 1980, the date of the decision in Trimble v.
Gordon, April 26, 1977, or January 1, 1975, the effective date of the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974. Although the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Brown relied on Article 12, section 5 of the 1974 constitu-
tion prohibiting discrimination on the basis of birth, it was not at all
clear in 1974 that this provision would be applied to inheritance by
illegitimates." On the contrary, the Louisiana system of disfavoring
illegitimates had been upheld in 1971 by the United States Supreme
Court'in Labine v. Vincent.'7 To use 1975 as the point of demarca-
tion would generate some of the inequities noted by the supreme
court in Lovell. Trimble v. Gordon certainly sent a signal, but that
case involved Illinois law, did not overrule Labine v. Vincent, and in
footnote 17 suggested that there might be a distinction which could
preserve the viability of the Louisiana system. There were early
warnings of the Brown decision in Succession of Robbins" and Suc-
cession of Thompson," both of which held codal prohibitions against
testamentary bequests to illegimate children as violations of both
the Federal and State Constitutions. Only in Brown, however, did
the Louisiana Supreme Court apply the state and federal constitu-
tions to irregular intestate succession. For these reasons, I think the
September 3, 1980 date should be accepted.'
45. 397 So. 2d 830, 832 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981) (Redmann, J., dissenting).
46. But consider the following language from the Brown opinion: "The members of
the constitutional convention intended this article to include within its scope unreason-
able discrimination based upon illegitimacy, Succession of Thompson, 367 So. 2d 798
(La. 1979)." 388 So. 2d 1151, 1154 (La. 1980).
47. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
48. 349 So. 2d 276 (La. 1977).
49. See cases cited in note 40. supra.
50. The Louisiana Supreme Court will probably take up the matter before long. A
district court in DeSoto Parish apparently has applied Succession of Brown retroac-
tively. IMC Exploration Co. v. Henderson, No. 37, 807, 11th Judicial District Court,
DeSoto Parish, Louisiana, currently on appeal to the second circuit.
[Vol. 42
